The White House released a 35-page document today entitled, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.” Since I only have to write a few web pages for work, five final papers for school, and construct a portfolio of my last three semesters for my level review, I figured that I had plenty of time to read through it and provide my thoughts (man, I love college).

Here are the details of the report, plus my responses.

“Unlike past wars, however, victory in Iraq will not come in the form of an enemy’s surrender, or be signaled by a single particular event – there will be no Battleship Missouri, no Appomattox. The ultimate victory will be achieved in stages…”

The White House goes on to delineate those stages, but I can’t help but think how each of those stages seem to correspond to the exact stages of victory we once had in Vietnam. Where our fathers were supposed to stop the Viet-Cong, our brother, sisters, and friends are supposed to stop the terrorists and insurgents. Where South Vietnam was supposed to become our model of democracy and capitalism in Southeast Asia, Iraq is supposed to become our model in the Middle East. Where South Vietnam was supposed to provide its own security (and we were just advisors - at least in the beginning), Iraq is supposed to develop its own army and security force.

I don’t want to say that, because we lost in Vietnam, we will necessarily lose in Iraq. Instead, I want to make clear that the definition of victory for each of the wars seem to be the same. With that in mind, we must be careful not to pursue the same strategies to achieve that victory.

The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front in their war against humanity. And we must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror.

I agree 100%, but I’m bothered by the fact that the White House does not recognize that its actions are what made Iraq the central front in the war on terror in the first place. That concern aside, the Administration is trying to make it clear that anything less than complete victory is unacceptable in Iraq. While I agree in theory, the cost of achieving complete victory seems to outweigh the potential benefits. I say potential because I don’t think it realistic that we can ever achieve the complete victory that the White House has in mind.

Does that mean we should cut and run? I’m not sure. Let’s keep reading the document and see where we end up.

The White House includes a section on the benefits of victory in Iraq. Each of them are true benefits, and they are summed up as making America “safer, stronger, and more certain of its future.” It then goes deeper into why America would be that way. Each of the items are truly beneficial to America, and it would be ridiculous to argue with them. The question, however, is not why we should win, but if we can win.

Following the benefits, the White House includes the consequences of our failure. Since a majority of people in the country now seem to think that we should cut and run (according to a Harris Poll conducted between November 8th - 13th, 63% of adults think we should bring our troops home within the year, regardless of whether Iraq has a stable government), it only seems fair to provide the entire section here in order for the White House to have its complete response heard:

If we and our Iraqi partners fail in Iraq, Iraq will become:

• A safe haven for terrorists as Afghanistan once was, only this time in some of the world’s most strategic territory, with vast natural resources to exploit and to use to fund future attacks.
• A country where oppression – and the brutal imposition of inhumane practices, such as those of the Taliban in Afghanistan – is pervasive.
• A failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East, with all the attendant risks and incalculable costs for American security and prosperity.

Furthermore, if we and our Iraqi partners fail in Iraq, the terrorists will have:

• Won a decisive victory over the United States, vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and ruthless intimidation of civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against Americans and other free people across the globe.
• Placed the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region, weakening our friends, and clearing the way for terrorist attacks here at home. The terrorists will be emboldened in their belief that America cannot stand and fight, but will cut and run in the face of adversity.
• Called into question American credibility and commitment in the region and the world. Our friends and foes alike would doubt our staying power, and this would damage our efforts to counter other security threats and to advance other economic and political interests worldwide.
  • Since 1998, Al Qaida has repeatedly cited Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, as examples to encourage more attacks against America and our interests overseas.
• Weakened the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in the region – a historic opportunity, central to America’s long-term security, forever lost.

If we retreat from Iraq, the terrorists will pursue us and our allies, expanding the fight to the rest of the region and to our own shores.

It’s difficult to argue with any of this. If we lose in Iraq, yes, it would be a bad thing. But if it is not clear that we can actually win, then what choice do we really have?

Following the description of what would happen if we fail, the White House describes who our enemies are and why they are fighting us. The familiar designation of “insurgents” has been replaced by two new groups (perhaps these are the subgroups of the more general insurgents): Rejectionists and Saddamists. The former is comprised of the Sunni Arabs who refuse to embrace an Iraqi government in which they are no longer the privileged elite, as they were under Saddam. The latter “harbor dreams of reestablishing a Ba’athist dictatorship.” The White House thinks that the Rejectionists will see the light sooner or later and that the Saddamists are weak enough to be defeated by Iraq’s own security forces.

The final group, the terrorists affiliated with or inspired by Al Qaida, “make up the smallest enemy group but are the most lethal and pose the most immediate threat…This group cannot be won over and must be defeated – killed or captured – through sustained counterterrorism operations.”

Question: If we pull our troops out of Iraq, but leave behind a small band of counter-terrorist operatives (what we might call, “advisors”), have we achieved victory? Or is victory achieved only when we defeat the terrorists? If the former, then it seems Congress should pass H.J. Res. 55 (the “Homeward Bound” proposal that has our troops coming home in 2006) as soon as possible. If the latter, then I think victory is impossible. As I’ve said before and will say again, “terrorism” is a tactic, not an entity. “It” can never be defeated. Even if we kill Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, we cannot kill every militant, anti-American fundamentalist on the planet. Influential as they may be, revolutionary leaders like Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi are not the revolution.

After designating the enemy, the White House takes it upon itself to define the enemies own “strategy for victory.”

Intimidate, coerce, or convince the Iraqi public not to support the transition to democracy by persuading them that the nascent Iraqi government is not competent and will be abandoned by a Coalition that lacks the stomach for this fight.

In other words, the terms of victory for the enemy is for us to lose. It has no constructive victory of its own. It does not seek to create a fundamentalist state in Iraq. It does not seek to rid the Holy Land of the infidels. And it does not seek to create its own site of fundamentalist reform in the region, giving hope to fundamentalist reformers throughout the Middle East.

But I can’t help but wonder if this is true. If the enemy in Iraq only seeks to defeat us, wouldn’t all of our enemies be fighting on their side. Wouldn’t Cuba be lending its support? What about the the anti-capitalist factions in Central and South America? Why haven’t the North Koreans thrown in with the enemy in Iraq? Why isn’t China considering coming out against us? I mean, military commanders have complained about our forces being spread too thin around the world. If our enemies truly seek nothing but our defeat, then now would be the best time for them to attack.

But if they don’t just seek to destroy us, if they do harbor constructive goals of their own, then it would make sense for our enemies not to band together. China does share the constructive goals of North Korea, nor do either of them share the goals of the enemy in Iraq, and Cuba seeks little more than to stay alive in spite of our attempts to destroy it.

After defining our enemy’s terms of victory, the White House describes the tactics used to achieve that victory:

The enemy’s strategy, in short, is to intimidate, terrorize, and tear down– a strategy with short-term advantage because it is easier to tear down than to build up. But this strategy is not sustainable in the long term because it is rejected by the overwhelming mass of the Iraqi population.

Obviously, this “tearing down” is directly caused by the perception that the enemy has no constructive goal of its own. But I have to ask, are they only tearing down because of our overwhelming force? In other words, in the face of a superpower that is seeking to destroy you, how would you go about building anything of your own?

It’s easy for us, sitting here in the comfort of the United States, to denounce terrorism as a tactic. But what if an overwhelming force invaded our cities, towns, and homes? Would we be so civilized as to only fight that force in a “proper” manner, facing its tanks and guns and missiles on a “proper” battlefield, or would we do whatever was necessary to get them out of our homes?

After claiming that the enemy only seeks to destroy and tear down, the White House lays out its own strategy for victory. The strategy follows three integrated tracks: political, security, and economic. Each track has three objectives of their own:

• The Political Track:
  • Isolate those who can be won over from those who can’t,
  • Engage the regular Iraqi people an invite them to participate in the development of their country,
  • Build institutions that protect and facilitate Iraqi development
• The Security Track
  • Clear areas of enemy control,
  • Hold areas already free,
  • Build Iraqi state and local security forces
• The Economic Track
  • Restore Iraq’s infrastructure,
  • Reform Iraq’s economy to allow self-sustainment,
  • Build the capacity of Iraq to maintain itself, join the global economic community, and improve its citizens’ welfare

Note that each of these tracks end with the command to “build,” which can’t help but be opposed to the enemy’s intent to “tear down.” Do you think this is a coincidence or is it evidence of a rhetorical strategy? Of course, rhetoric does not imply emptiness of content, so its presence here shouldn’t automatically convince us that the content is unsound.

However, I can’t help but notice that the country we will have built is quite similar to the United States. This, in itself, is not a bad thing, but the United States was built from a strong foundation of (Judeo-Christian influenced) secularism. Furthermore, contrary to the extreme right-wing’s understanding of our freedoms as a gift from God, our freedoms are contingent upon the evolution of democracy as a political system. America was not “given to us.” It was the climax of a long, long historical narrative, where the major plot points involve the sustained devaluation of traditional authority, from the Pope to the King. The Middle East does not have this history.

The creation of a democratic state in the region demands a huge ideological gestalt-switch on behalf of the people. As part of this gestalt-switch, they have to claim power for themselves. The argument for and against this power grab are the same arguments for and against the recognition of gay rights in this country. If we, who have a history of claiming power, can’t grab our own power from out of the hands of the Bible and tradition, how is a civilization that has recognized the governing power of the Koran supposed to become democratic?

That may sound racist (we can be free, but they can’t), but it is not. It is historicist. I’m not saying they can’t be free, but I am saying that we can’t give them their freedom. They need to claim it for themselves.

After describing our strategy, the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” moves on to the second part of the paper.

Part II of this paper will discuss the three tracks – political, security, and economic – in more detail, so Americans can better understand the elements of our vital mission, the nature of our strategy, why we believe this strategy will succeed, the progress we are making, and how our
government is organized to help Iraqis ensure lasting victory in Iraq.

I don’t know about you, but I’m extremely interested in that last part. Let’s continue, shall we?

First, the White House lays out what we have accomplished so far:

Much has been accomplished in Iraq, including the removal of Saddam’s tyranny, negotiation of an interim constitution, restoration of full sovereignty, holding of free national elections, formation of an elected government, drafting of a permanent constitution, ratification of that constitution, introduction of a sound currency, gradual restoration of Iraq’s neglected infrastructure, and the ongoing training and equipping of Iraq’s security forces.

All of which sounds fantastic, but almost all of it, except for the first and last parts, was mostly a matter of putting words on paper. Regardless, these are all good accomplishments, and I shouldn’t belittle them. But they don’t change the fact that, as the White House writes in the next section, many challenges remain:

• Iraq has never had a functioning democracy and we shouldn’t expect one only three years after Saddam was removed
• The enemy is ruthless and multiheaded
• Terrorism demands a sustained response that will last an unpredictable number of years
• The region is inhospitable
• The Sunnis want power
• Many regions in Iraq fear a central government
• Many Iraqis want revenge on the Sunnis
• Democracy necessarily permits the rise of anti-democratic groups
• The militias and armed groups, often affiliated with political parties, hamper the rule of law
• Modern Iraq has never known anything but a highly-centralized and corrupt economy

Even if we get rid of bullet number two (that is, even if we get rid of the enemy), there are tremendous challenges to overcome. How possible is it, really, to overcome these challenges in the presence of an unstoppable enemy (unstoppable because the enemy, as we’ve seen, is the preferred tactic of malcontents, who will always be present)?

The White House continues

Although we are confident of victory in Iraq, we will not put a date certain on when each stage of success will be reached – because the timing of success depends upon meeting certain conditions, not arbitrary timetables….Arbitrary deadlines or timetables for withdrawal of Coalition forces – divorced from conditions on the ground – would be irresponsible and deadly, as they would suggest to the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists that they can simply wait to win.

With that being said:

We expect, but cannot guarantee, that our force posture will change over the next year, as
the political process consolidates and as Iraqi Security Forces grow and gain experience….The mission of our forces will change – from conducting operations and keeping the peace, to more specialized operations targeted at the most vicious terrorists and leadership networks.

This sounds similar to what I said above and what H.J. Res. 55 suggests, except where H.J. Res 55 declares a date for the achievement of this goal (no later than October 1, 2006), the White House refuses to set one.

While the White House may suggest that the terrorists can just “wait us out,” what is to stop the terrorists from doing the same thing without that date? If I was a terrorist, I’d stop blowing shit up right now. I’d know the American people want me gone, and I’d know that the President has to start getting his shit together before the mid-term elections next fall. So why not stop fighting, let the Americans claim victory and leave, and then start blowing shit up again once the American tanks have left the country?

Of course, I’m not a military strategist (terrorist or not), so I’m sure there’s a major flaw in my thinking. But my point remains: if the White House doesn’t want the terrorists to just “wait us out,” setting a timetable for our withdrawal does not provoke such a response. Instead, it forces us to be accountable for our strategy (apparently, the body count doesn’t have an effect on our mission). A timetable doesn’t change our strategic goals, it simply forces us to achieve them.

Which brings up an interesting question, and one I hope to see answered as we move through this document: What is forcing our progress in Iraq? Why should someone do something now as opposed to later? We set timetables for the turnover of power to the Iraqi government, timetables for the creation of a constitution, and timetables for the first election. Those timetables forced us to achieve them, otherwise we would have looked weak. Why not set timetables (not arbitrary, but motivated by our ability to achieve the actual objectives) for our withdrawal?

I suggest that the reason we can’t set a timetable is because someone, somewhere in the White House or the Pentagon understands the impossibility of defeating terrorism. For the same reason that there is no timetable on the war on drugs, there is no timetable on the war on terror.

If timetables don’t define our victory, then how about metrics?

We track numerous indicators to map the progress of our strategy and change our tactics whenever necessary.

The White House then describes the metrics it tracks (some of which are available to the public: gains in Iraqi security forces, improvements in Iraq’s economy, and tri-monthly reports to Congress by departments of State and Defense). Okay, then, why not set a specific number on whatever metrics are important and use that to define our success? For example, we win and can start withdrawal when Iraq has such-and-such a number of security forces, has reached such-and-such a number of GDP, such-and-such a number of Iraqis are providing us with useful intelligence against the enemy (which shows how much or how little support the enemy has within Iraq), etc.

Setting a metrical definition of victory would not be arbitrary. And yet, this document does not provide that. Instead, we get vague terms like an Iraq that makes progress, inspires reformers, and becomes peaceful, united, and stable. All of those terms are great, but how are they defined?

Give us a curve that represents the desired progress, a number of democratic reformers that must be created for inspiration to have happened, exactly how many car bombs we can accept before the country is peaceful, how many political parties and the percentage of offices they must hold before the country is united, and the crime rate that we are striving for in order to consider the country stable. I’m not looking for arbitrary numbers, but very specific ones.

This brings us to page seventeen of a thirty-five page document. The next twelve pages provide the details behind the three-track strategy, and the final eight pages are an appendix with specific information on the Eight Pillars of the strategic objectives:

1. Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency
2. Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance
3. Help Iraqis Form a National Compact for Democratic Government
4. Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services
5. Help Iraq Strengthen its Economy
6. Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights
7. Increase International Support for Iraq
8. Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents

Given the assumptions of the three tracks, all of the details make sense to me and if you want to look at them, I recommend that you download the PDF.

With that being said, I still don’t think that the President has provided us with an exit strategy. As I’ve tried to make clear, the terms of victory are either impossible (defeating the tactic of terrorism) or ill-defined. If I am to support any exit strategy from this White House, it will need to include hard numbers as the criterion for success.

Unfortunately, from this White House, I only expect to receive more of the same: words that sound powerful, but that are too flimsy to hold up under investigation.